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Article 12

GEOFF CHILDS

DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, ST LOUIS

CULTURE CHANGE IN THE NAME OF
CULTURAL PRESERVATION
1

“The resultant
processes of culture
change are veiled
by a persistent
assumption…that
Tibetan culture
ﬁnds its expression
ﬁrst and foremost in
monastic Buddhism,
and that anything
that does not ﬁt the
normative mold
represents degeneration from a pristine
cultural template.
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his essay explores the ways that Western
economic support for Tibetan exile monasteries
in South Asia stimulates (1) the exodus of
young males from the Buddhist highlands of Nepal,
and (2) the homogenization of diverse religious
practices in those same areas. I argue that the attempt
to “preserve” Tibetan culture by supporting monks
and monasteries has unanticipated consequences that
reverberate beyond the point of articulation between
patrons and priests. The resultant processes of
culture change are veiled by a persistent assumption
about the nature of Tibetan societies, namely, that
Tibetan culture ﬁnds its expression ﬁrst and foremost
in monastic Buddhism, and that anything that does
not ﬁt the normative mold represents degeneration
from a pristine cultural template (see Ramble 1993).

My argument relates to Shneiderman’s observation
that “more static notions of religious identities”
are being encouraged throughout the highlands of
Nepal by “extra-local entities” (e.g., Tibetan exile
monasteries, foreign charitable organizations, and
state governments), resulting in “shifts in local
notions of religious authority” (Shneiderman n.d.).
At the core of this essay are two interrelated arguments, one demographic and one cultural. The demographic argument begins by noting that money
provided by Western donors to support Tibetan
rinpoches (“precious one”, a title of respect for an
esteemed lama) has resulted in a proliferation of
monasteries in exile. Meanwhile, the decline of fertility among Tibetan refugees has prompted these
resurrected institutions to look for new sources of
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recruits. The ethnically Tibetan, religiously Buddhist, high
fertility highlands of Nepal has emerged as their primary
recruiting ground. The cultural argument considers the
ramiﬁcations of these new migration patterns. Some individuals from Nepal’s highlands who receive training in the
exile monasteries subsequently become catalysts for culture
change; returning to their natal villages, they encounter religious systems that differ from the
ones they were trained in, and set
out to rectify matters. In short, the
working hypotheses for this essay
are the following:
Hypothesis 1: The recent proliferation of exile monasteries,
supported in part by foreign
patrons, has increased the demand for monks. The rapid
fertility decline among Tibetan
exiles has stimulated the intensiﬁcation of recruitment efforts
in Nepal’s Buddhist highlands,
resulting in an unprecedented
level of out-migration of young
males.
Hypothesis 2: The goal of preserving Tibetan culture is a
rationale for Westerners to support Tibetan exile monasteries.
An unintended consequence
of foreign patronage for these
monasteries is the loss of cultural diversity in the ethnically
Tibetan, Buddhist highlands of
Nepal.
This is not the ﬁrst study to ex- Young monk, Paro
amine the interactions between
Tibetan Buddhists and Western disciples (e.g., Batchelor
1994; Lopez 1998; Prebish and Baumann 2002; Moran
2004, Zablocki 2005). My own approach to this topic diverges from other studies of “transnational Buddhism” (1) by
concentrating on cultural changes that occur in places far
removed from the points of contact between Westerners and
their Tibetan Buddhists, and (2) by examining the interactions between the transnational ﬂow of charitable giving and
demographic trends.
The social impacts that Western economic systems have
on local communities is an important topic in the social sciences. Several decades ago critics of modernization theory
posited that so-called “traditional societies” (those characterized by their isolation, impoverishment, and adherence to
customs) were in fact created through marginalization; that
is, they are by-products of capitalism and colonialism (Frank
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1967; Wallerstein 1979). Anthropologists working from the
perspective of political economy contributed important studies about changes instigated when local communities become
integrated into a global, capitalist market system (e.g., Wolf
1982). A derivative of this research is the current focus on
“globalization” (Eriksen 2003; Trouillot 2003). Although definitions of this concept vary across disciplines and according
to theoretical interests, one that is
particularly succinct and useful for
the purpose of this essay is the following: “Contemporary globalization is the increasing ﬂow of trade,
ﬁnance, culture, ideas, and people
brought about by the sophisticated
technology of communications and
travel by the worldwide spread of
neoliberal capitalism, and it is the
local and regional adaptations to
and resistance against these ﬂows”
(Lewellen 2002).
Lewellen’s deﬁnition is used
here as a starting point to sort out
the local and regional adaptations
resulting from the ﬂows of capital between Westerners and exile
monasteries, albeit in this case the
focus is on charitable giving rather
than on the spread of capitalism.
Modern communications and the
relative ease of international travel
help facilitate the ﬂow of capital
between Western patrons and
their Tibetan lamas. Gone are the
days when disciples had to journey
to the East to meet their mentors.
P HOTO: GARY G OLDENBERG
Nowadays some rinpoches live
more or less permanently in the West; many of their disciples have never set foot in Nepal, India, or Tibet. Modern
communications diminish the distance between students
and teachers. I recall sitting with a rinpoche in Kathmandu
when a disciple called his cell phone from the U.S. to discuss
a bad dream and other obstacles to his meditation practice.
The internet also eases the dissemination of information
across the globe. Travel and teaching schedules of rinpoches
are regularly posted on sites associated with Buddhist organizations. A cursory Google search uncovered itineraries for
more than twenty different lamas who will travel from South
Asia to the U.S. during the summer of 2005. The increasing
frequency and intensity of international contacts has made
it easier than ever for lamas to relay their requests to foreign
patrons, and for those patrons to convert the requests into
monetary support by raising funds that then enter the trans-

national stream of capital.
Before proceeding, some caveats are in order. First, Westerners are not the only ones who patronize Tibetan lamas and
their monasteries in exile. A considerable amount of funding comes from Taiwan (both from government and private
sources), and in more recent times from Buddhist communities in Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia (Moran 2004;
Zablocki 2005). The focus on Western patrons is prompted
by the explicit connection they often make between charitable giving and cultural preservation, an ideology that sets
them apart from benefactors in other countries. Second, for
the purpose of simplifying the analysis, this paper centers exclusively on monks. Nuns are excluded for practical and demographic reasons [I have better data on monks, and monks
outnumber nuns nine to one in the Tibetan exile population
(Planning Council 2000:215)]. Third, I have created what
many will consider a false dichotomy between Buddhist monasticism and village-level religious practices, a gross simpliﬁcation that glosses over the historical, syncretistic processes
that have shaped Tibetan religion over the course of centuries (see Kapstein 2000). My justiﬁcation for doing so is that
a degree of generalization is necessary to make some of my
points, and hope that it will not prove to be too much of a
distraction. Finally, a methodological clariﬁcation is in order.
I am using the internet as a source of data. Unlike printed
publications, web sites are ephemeral. Between writing the
initial (2002) and ﬁnal (2005) editions of this essay many
of the web sites quoted herein have changed their contents.
Therefore, the reader will have to take it on trust that I am
accurately citing the postings from previous times.

WESTERN VISIONS OF TIBETAN
BUDDHIST SOCIETY
Westerners have been selective when it comes to
understanding and portraying Tibetan society (Bishop 1990;
Lopez 1998), being far more captivated by the esoteric,
philosophical dimensions of Buddhism than by villagelevel religious practices. Not only were Buddhism and “folk
religion” analytically separated in earlier academic writings
(Hoffman 1975; Tucci 1980), these days most primers on
Tibetan religion present the histories and philosophies
of the major Buddhist sects while ignoring altogether the
folk traditions (e.g., Powers 1995; Thurman 1995; Ray
2002; Newman 2004; c.f. Samuel 1993). To be fair, these
books are about Tibetan Buddhism, not about syncretistic
religious practices in a Tibetan social context. Nevertheless,
I suspect that the tendency to focus on normative aspects of
monastic Buddhism can be partially explained by a common
refrain one hears among Western Buddhists, namely, that
“Buddhism is a philosophy, not a religion”. Adopting such
a perspective allows one to relegate many religious practices

to the periphery since they are not “Buddhist” and hence
are of little relevance. Obviously, rituals meant to propitiate
malevolent forces that threaten crops or bovines have no
applicability in the life of a suburban-dwelling Western
disciple.
Tibetan exiles are also active agents in propagating speciﬁc images of their society for strategic purposes (Huber
2001). They are adept at “deploying” a vision of their culture
to mobilize political support (McLagan 1997), including the
viewpoint that certain monastic-based rituals beneﬁt all of
humanity (Schrempf 1997). Prodded by the favorable reception that they have received in the West, Tibetans now help
disseminate the equation that normative monastic Buddhism
equals Tibetan culture.
The task of perpetuating the above equation is now fulﬁlled—whether consciously or not—by people whose views
carry considerable weight with the general public, including
leaders of the Tibetan exile community and Western supporters of Tibetan causes. For example, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile’s ofﬁcial web site contains a section titled
“Tibetan Culture” (www.tibet.com, viewed 6/05). The vast
majority of essays focus on religious leaders and the monastic tradition. Tibet House Trust, a Tibetan charity inaugurated by the Dalai Lama, states as an objective “to preserve
Tibetan identity and culture.” Under “cultural activities”, the
organization listed a Buddhist seminar in London and sponsorships for monks and nuns (www.tibet.com/Trust/trust,
viewed 2/02). The Students for a Free Tibet web page used
to contain a blurb on “Tibetan Culture” that was exclusively
devoted to the teachings of Sakyamuni (www.tibet.org.sft,
viewed 2/02). The Amitabha Foundation, a non-proﬁt organization dedicated to “preserving and promoting the unique
beauty of Tibetan culture while providing for the needs of
Tibetan refugees living in exile,” asserted on their web page
that,
Tibetan culture is inextricably intertwined with Buddhist
forms. Indeed, it is impossible to effectively introduce Tibetan
culture to an American audience without presenting Buddhist
ceremony or philosophy.
(www.amitabhafoundation.org, viewed 2/02)

Finally, Tibet House, a well-endowed organization in New
York patronized by some high-proﬁle public ﬁgures, runs a
Tibetan Studies Program. In 2002 their stated goal was,
[To] develop a comprehensive overview of the insights, experiences and practices essential to understanding the Tibetan world view. It is divided into three modules: the yoga
of ordinary living; women and Buddhism in the West; and
the transformative relationship in spiritual development and
psychotherapy. In addition, there is a workshop exploring the
intertwined nature of faith, meditation and practice in Buddhism today, and a second workshop on the spiritual problem
of giving yourself away (www.tibethouse.org, viewed 2/02).
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These are just a sampling of perspectives that help shape
the Western imagination about Tibetan culture. The message
they propagate is that monastic Buddhism and its esoteric
teachings represent the essence of Tibetan culture; everything else is peripheral. Monasteries and religious education
have unquestionably been cornerstones of Tibetan society
for centuries—that point is beyond debate. As highly visible
institutions possessing considerable prestige (the clergy was
situated at the apex of the social hierarchy) and power (political might was wielded through the control over productive resources), monasteries occupied a preeminent position
within Tibetan society. Their role in shaping Tibetan culture
has been profound, yet monasteries represent only one aspect of Tibetan religion: they did not have a monopoly on
the spiritual life of the communities they dominated. Village
religious practices, characterized by one scholar as having a
“pragmatic orientation” (Samuel 1993), centered on a plethora of deities inhabiting the natural environment. Lay people
devoted a great deal of time and energy to placating these
deities, arguably far more so than listening to sermons by
lamas or studying Buddhist scripture (prior to recent times
most Tibetans were illiterate).
Similarly, an inescapable lesson deriving from my longterm ﬁeldwork in the ethnically Tibetan enclave of Nubri
(Gorkha District, Nepal—until the 1850s a part of rDzongdga’ District in Tibet) is that a Tibetan religious system involves far more than monasteries and monks (Childs 2004).
I refer to it as a religious system, since the entirety of ritual and spiritual life relies on several specialists operating
within a well-delineated division of labor. Nubri has a few
celibate monks (dge-slong) who spend much of their time
delving into the most esoteric teachings and practices, while
also dispensing spiritual advice to community members.
Meanwhile, lineage lamas (sngags-pa) perform ceremonies to
accomplish mundane objectives such as warding off bovine
pestilence, assuring the longevity of a patron, removing the
pollution associated with childbirth, or dispelling hidden
forces that cause illness. The pha-jo (similar to the bon-po and
lha-bon elsewhere) is responsible for making offerings to the
local protector deity (yul-lha) in order to maintain harmony
between the villagers and the natural elements, while the astrologer (rtsis-pa) composes natal horoscopes for every child
that is born and calculates auspicious days for weddings and
funerals. Many laymen are labeled mchod-pa, part-time practitioners with rudimentary liturgical training who mainly
participate in communal rituals. Nuns (a-ni jo-mo) occupy
a socially ambiguous position since their familial function
as caretakers for aging parents is valued more highly than
their role as ritual participants (see also Gutschow 2004).
The diverse religious practitioners function as a team, each
recognizing his or her sphere of authority and not encroaching upon the domains of the others. Villagers do not con-
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ceptualize a dichotomy between Buddhist and non-Buddhist
liturgical practices, preferring instead to view all aspects of
their religious system as an interdependent whole. In this regard Nubri is by no means unique, as attested by the ethnographic literature on the Himalayan region (see for example
Clarke 1980; Holmberg 1989; Mumford 1989; Ramble 1990;
Diemberger 1992).
In places such as Nubri, Yolmo (Clarke 1980), and until
recently Khumbu (Ortner 1989), monasteries populated by
celibate monks are less central to religious life than communal temples presided over by married lamas. The predominance of Nyingmapa afﬁliation no doubt helps explain the
way that religion is integrated within Nepal’s highland societies. Celibate monasteries do exist, but compared to Tibet
are rare, less prominent in the socioeconomic realm, and in
many places are newcomers that were established during the
twentieth century. The Sherpas, for example, built their ﬁrst
monastery for celibate monks less than one hundred years
ago (Ortner 1989). In short, the social organization of religion in the ethnically Tibetan communities of Nepal is quite
different from the representation of Tibetan Buddhist society
that is popular in the West.
China’s repressive rule in Tibet led to the ﬂight of some
of Tibet’s most eminence lamas to Nepal and India. They
were accompanied by thousands of lay people, including
many who specialized in the performance of “non-Buddhist”
rituals. Once in exile these latter individuals found a diminished role to play in society. For one, the preponderance of
their rituals was intimately tied to the landscapes of their
ancestral homelands. How can one propitiate a yul-lha if the
mountain abode of that deity lays across the Himalayan massif in Tibet? Vestiges of village religion that have managed
to survive are often denigrated. Recall, for example, how the
astrologer in Khyentse Norbu’s ﬁlm The Cup was portrayed as
a drunken, disheveled, malodorous buffoon. One man who
used to specialize in propitiating protective local deities informed me that clerics in exile have discouraged him from
performing his rituals. Unlike village-based practices which
have withered to the point of non-existence, monastic Buddhism could be disengaged from the surrounding landscape
and continues to enjoy a prestigious position in exile society.
Resurrection is proof of its adaptability. As a result, visitors
to the Tibetan communities of Nepal and India can easily
come away with the impression that monastic Buddhism is,
and always has been, the centerpiece of Tibetan religious
culture. It therefore seems natural to equate support for such
institutions with the preservation of Tibetan culture.

THE NATURE OF PATRONAGE
Most monasteries in pre-1959 Tibet were supported by their
land holdings, or more accurately, by the peasants who

farmed monastery lands and performed corvée labor in
exchange for a stipulated portion of the produce and other
rights (Carrasco 1959; Surkhang 1986). For example, during
the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama (late 1600s), Drepung
monastery’s population of 4,200 monks was sustained by
553 lay households (Dung-dkar 1991:74). Members of those
households did not fund the monastery through voluntary
donations. Rather, their support was part of a contractual
agreement between the owners of the land (Drepung) and
the peasants, the majority of whom were born into positions
of servitude to the monastery.
The resurgence of Tibet’s monasteries in exile was contingent upon ﬁnding new sources of funding. As refugees they
could not replicate the land tenure system that previously
existed in Tibet, but as Klieger (1991) argues, Tibetans have
successfully invoked a traditional priest-patron relationship
(chos-yon) to derive beneﬁts from their interactions with
foreigners. By the mid 1990s there were an estimated 45
Tibetan monasteries scattered about the Kathmandu Valley
(Frechette 2004:111). The primary means of support came

Children with photo of Dalai Lama

through Western patronage. According to Frechette,
Tibetan Lamas, according to one estimate [source of estimate not revealed], can earn as much as $40,000 to $60,000
through just one tour of the U.S. or Europe. When they establish dharma centers (teaching centers) in the U.S. or Europe,
they create a more continuous source of foreign funds. According to one source [derived from Coleman 1993], 77 percent of
all Tibetan lamas in exile have traveled to the U.S. or Europe,
and 51 percent have emigrated to Europe, the U.S., Canada,
Australia or New Zealand to resettle in dharma centers. They
use the foreign donations they solicit through their tours and
dharma centers to ﬁnance their monasteries in Nepal and India (2004:111-112).

From an early date some Westerners equated support for
Tibetan monasteries with the preservation of Tibetan culture. According to one perspective,
The ﬁrst Americans to work for the survival of Tibetan culture
were originally attracted to Buddhist philosophy. Through
contact with Buddhist forms they came to work for Tibetan
survival. These people remain the backbone for western support
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of the Tibetans’ struggle to preserve their threatened traditions.
(www.amithabafoundation.org, viewed 2/02)

Today, a recurrent refrain among monasteries in exile and
the Western organizations that sustain them is that supporting monks is a means to safeguarding Tibetan culture. The
internet has become an important source for spreading the
message and soliciting funds to accomplish this objective.
For example,
The Drepung Loseling Educational Fund was established in
1988 to preserve traditional Tibetan culture by sponsoring a
monk in training at Drepung Loseling. (http://www.drepung.
org, viewed 6/05)

Kopan Monastery, home of a very popular meditation
course for foreign visitors to Nepal, made the appeal, “Help
save Tibetan culture: sponsor a Tibetan monk or nun” (www.
kopan-monastery.com, viewed 2/02). A monastery in India
requests,
To assist Drepung Gomang Monastery in its mission to educate
and train monks in the Buddhist philosophy of wisdom and
compassion and to prevent the extinction of the culture of Tibet, we ask that you sponsor a monk at the monastery (www.
gomang.org, viewed 6/05)

Another historically signiﬁcant institution makes the following appeal:
Gyuto Tantric University in India is one of the few remaining
places where the ancient, sacred Tibetan teachings are available. Therefore, many young men continue to risk their lives to
journey over the boarder from Tibet to India, to join the monks
and become one of their number. Your donation will not only
help support a Gyuto monk - it will help preserve these ancient
practices as well. (www.gyuto.va.com.au, viewed 6/05)

Organizations in the West make similar petitions. Tibetan
Monastery, based in New York City, with the mission “to
preserve the unique spiritual wisdom and cultural heritage
of Tibet through providing a wide range of programs on
Buddhism and Tibetan culture”, is a conduit for sponsoring
a monk or nun (www.tibetanmonstery.com, viewed 2/02).
Similarly, the Tibetan Sponsorship Project states, “Our vision is to see the Tibetan religion and culture remain alive
and ﬂourish.” One of their methods for accomplishing this
objective is to fund a monk (www.tibetaid.org, viewed 2/02).
The newsletter of a Buddhist organization in the U.S. discloses the amount of funding that they sent to their lama’s
monastery, then states, “Through this effort, each sponsor
helps these young monks in the process of studying and
preserving the precious Dharma, as well as their Tibetan
culture” (www.kurukulla.org, viewed 6/05). Similarly, one
particular solicitation for sponsorship argues:
The Monks are of vital importance to the progress of Buddhism. The monks are the major source and labor behind the
preservation of the Tibetan language, culture, dance rituals,
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prayers and practices, written language (Sanskrit) and holy
traditions and transmissions brought from India by the most
excellent master Padmasambhava. (www. ripaladrang.org,
viewed 6/05)

Finally, one organization entreats,
Help these young people [i.e., the monks pictured on the web
site] to inherit the richness of their own culture. This is a rare
opportunity to preserve a vital link for future generations
(www.shechen.org, viewed 6/05).

The above citations represent a mere sample of sponsoring organizations. Others do not make the explicit claim
that supporting a monk is synonymous with saving Tibetan
culture. Nevertheless, they still transmit this very message,
at least implicitly, by including a history section outlining
the rise of Buddhist monasticism in Tibet, its demise under Chinese rule in Tibet, and its resurrection in exile. The
accompanying claims of “cultural genocide” leave no doubt
that providing support for an exile monastery is akin to preserving Tibet’s cultural heritage.

MONASTIC PATRONAGE:
A STIMULUS FOR MIGRATION
Hypothesis 1: The recent proliferation of exile monasteries, supported in part by foreign patrons, has increased the demand
for monks. The rapid fertility decline among Tibetan exiles has
stimulated the intensiﬁcation of recruitment efforts in Nepal’s
Buddhist highlands, resulting in an unprecedented level of outmigration of young males.
When exile monasteries were few in number the refugees
could be counted on to ﬁll the ranks by producing an adequate supply of children. As recently as 1987 the exiles’
Total Fertility Rate (the average number of children who
would be born to each woman in a population if age-speciﬁc fertility rates remain constant) exceeded six births per
woman (Childs et. al. 2005). As monasteries began to proliferate their supply of monks was reinforced by a new wave of
refugees. During the 1980s China’s relaxing of restrictions
on religion in Tibet was followed by crackdowns that forced
many novice monks to ﬂee across the Himalayas where they
were absorbed into the exile monasteries. Laymen who escaped Tibet further swelled the ranks when persuaded by
resettlement ofﬁcials to become monks on the grounds that
they would gain education and social status, not to mention
food and shelter in an alien land, and would consequently be
less of a burden on society.
Meanwhile, major demographic changes were underway.
Exile fertility plummeted from over six births per woman
in 1987 to less than two births per woman by 2000 (Childs
et. al. 2005). Those sons who were born to refugee parents
during the fertility transition were not likely to be designated

monks. Through interviews with young couples in Kathmandu and Dharamsala, I learned that most prefer secular
education over monasticism for their children, believing that
the decision to become a monk should be a matter of individual volition rather than parental prerogative. Secular education is now nearly universal among exiles. According to 1998
statistics 94% of exile children aged 5-16 in India and Nepal
were currently being educated in schools and monasteries.
Among those, the vast majority (96%) were in secular schools
(Planning Council 2000).
A forty-year emphasis on
secular education has led
to a transformation in the
value that exiles place on
monastic education. One
young man stated (and
claimed this to be a common sentiment among
people of his cohort) that
monasticism is a lesser
option in life that is only
ﬁtting for those who fail
to thrive in school, or
who show little aptitude
for business.
The fertility decline
and attitudinal changes
have caused a dramatic
reduction in the number Boys in school, Dharamsala
of monks that the refugees are now able—or willing—to
supply to the exile monasteries, thereby instigating a shift
in recruitment strategies. According to the testimony of one
lama who heads several monasteries and convents in Nepal,
During the time of the decrease in my merit, the Buddha
Dharma in the land of snow (Tibet) was diminishing. This was
especially the fate of [name of monastery] . . . At that time I
became a refugee and did not know where to go. During this
time of hardship, having the motivation to keep my monastery
alive, I purchased a small piece of land in front of the Great
Stupa of Boudhanath in Kathmandu, Nepal and built a small
monastery, which I named [name of monastery]. After building the monastery in Boudha, it was difﬁcult to ﬁnd children
who wanted to become monks. I decided to ask some people
I knew about ﬁnding children who wished to be monks. They
said, “Nowadays all people want to go to school and study or
to do business and earn much money. It’s almost impossible to
ﬁnd children to become monks.” After hearing this, I was very
depressed and disappointed but nevertheless I made a fruitful aspiration with good motivation and put many Chakras
(mandalas) of the Sangha and Harmony of the Sangha into
the main Buddha statue of the monastery. As a result of that,
[person’s name] became the ﬁrst monk from Nupri Village
[Nubri Valley], Gorkha [District], Nepal. Eventually the number of monks grew and ﬂourished and soon there were almost

as many monks as in the monastery in Tibet. (www.rinpoche.
com/Nupri/englishletter.htm, viewed 6/05)

Today, the preponderance of recruitment efforts centers
on children from the ethnically Tibetan borderlands of Nepal and India. Go to any Tibetan monastery in Boudhanath
and ask junior monks to state their place of origin. You will
ﬁnd that the vast majority are ethnic Tibetans from Nubri,
Tsum, Mustang, and Dolpo, Sherpas from Solu-Khumbu,
Tamangs from Rasuwa
District, and so forth.
You will be hard pressed
to ﬁnd anybody under
age ﬁfteen who was born
in Kathmandu to refugee
parents.
The persistence of high
fertility makes these areas productive grounds
for recruitment. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in
the highlands of Nepal
(4.8 births per woman) is
higher than in the middle
hills (4.0) or terai (4.1)
(Ministry of Health, New
ERA, and ORC Macro
2002: 56). TFRs for villages in Nubri range
P HOTO: TASHI TSERING
from 5.3 to 7.0 births per
woman (Childs 2001). Bear in mind that these ﬁgures represent an average that is mitigated by religious celibacy, infertility, and premature sterility. It is not uncommon for married
women to give birth to ten or more children, albeit the extremely high level of infant and childhood mortality reduces
the number of offspring who reach maturity. Nevertheless,
because mortality declines often precede fertility declines,
many highland areas of Nepal where monks are now being
recruited may be experiencing rapid population growth. Although no site-speciﬁc studies from the highlands exist to
conﬁrm this suspicion, aggregate data on the northernmost
districts of Nepal suggests a signiﬁcant decline in under-ﬁve
mortality (i.e., infant plus childhood mortality) occurred between 1996 and 2001 [from 208 deaths per 1000 live births
to 157 deaths per 1000 live births (Pradhan et. al. 1997:104;
Ministry of Health, New ERA, and ORC Macro 2002:131]. If
this is the case, then parents are confronting the reality that
more of their children are surviving to maturity.
In Nubri, dispatching a son to reside in one of Kathmandu’s monasteries has emerged as an important post-natal
option for parents to manage the size and composition of
their families. The decision is based on a combination of cultural and economic rationales. The cultural incentive is that
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parents and their son accrue blessings (sbyin-rlabs) and good
fortune (bsod-lde). From an economic perspective, sending
a son away removes him from the inheritance equation. Local regulations stipulate that no more than two brothers can
marry a single wife, thereby placing limits on polyandry as
an option parents can use to manage their assets over time.
All sons have an equal entitlement to claim their inheritance
at marriage. Therefore, if there are three sons in a family and
none are monks, then the estate must be divided into at least
two portions. Sending one son away to be a monk and contracting a polyandrous marriage for the other two ensures
that the family assets will be transferred intact to the next
generation.
Removing a son from the household also shifts the cost
of his upbringing from the parents to the religious institution, or more accurately, to foreign patrons. This beneﬁt is
not lost on parents. Although the people of Nubri are by no
means threatened by starvation, their economic fortunes can
wax and wane as a result of political decisions beyond their
control, for example the prohibiting or permitting of trade
of dbyar-rtsa dgun-’bu (cordyceps sinensis, a medicinal herb),
or China’s decisions to close the border in response to outbreaks of hoof and mouth disease. Throw in the usual hazards such as winter avalanches that can decimate one’s herd,
late snows and frosts that can doom a crop, or the death of
a young and productive worker in the family, and one can
begin to appreciate the degree of uncertainly that plagues
families in Nubri. Sending a son to the secure conﬁnes of a
monastery is a form of risk reduction.
Finally, once a talented monk comes of age he can garner a substantial income by giving teachings or performing
rituals for afﬂuent refugees and Western patrons. Personal
relationships with the latter can also result in sponsorships
dispensed as occasional gifts or monthly stipends. Some of
this cash returns as remunerations to parents back in their
highland villages. Although I have no data detailing levels of
such remunerations, I have heard parents in Nubri comparing notes with each other about the amount of money their
sons send back each year.
Sending a son away to be a monk is a long-term, household-level, economic diversiﬁcation strategy. Contrary to
common assumption, sending sons from Nubri to Tibetan
monasteries does not necessarily represent continuity with
tradition—at least not in terms of the sheer numbers of
children who are sent these days. Prior to 1959 a few men
from Nubri resided in Tibetan monasteries, most notably at
nearby Dagkar Taso (Brag-dkar rTa-so) situated to the north
of Kyirong. However, a proper monastic education entailed
signiﬁcant donations by parents, which presumably acted as
a disincentive. The situation has been changed by the proliferation of exile monasteries and the subsidies provided
for monks by foreign patrons; the cost to parents has been
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signiﬁcantly reduced (in fact, there is often no cost). By 1997,
the year I conducted a demographic survey, roughly 30% of
all male children in some Nubri villages were living in the
monasteries of Kathmandu and India. One man recently lamented that there are virtually no children between the ages
of ﬁve and ﬁfteen remaining in his village. Such a high level
of monastic out-migration is unprecedented in Nubri, and is
bound to have implications for all aspects of society.

CULTURE CHANGE IN THE NAME OF
CULTURAL PRESERVATION
Hypothesis 2: The goal of preserving Tibetan culture is a rationale for Westerners to support Tibetan exile monasteries. An
unintended consequence of foreign patronage for these monasteries is the loss of cultural diversity in the ethnically Tibetan,
Buddhist highlands of Nepal.
The second hypothesis seems counterintuitive. As established above, patronizing religious institutions is endorsed
by Tibetans and their Western supporters as a primary
means for preserving—not transforming—Tibetan culture.
The mere presence of monastic institutions in exile is cited as
tangible evidence that Tibetan culture is alive and thriving,
and in this regard foreign patronage has deﬁnitely contributed to the perseverance of Tibetan culture. However, the
second hypothesis concerns the ripple effects of patronage
that radiate outward from Kathmandu, in particular, the
unanticipated cultural transformations occurring in the indigenous Tibetan communities of highland Nepal that trace
their roots to the resurgence of monasticism in exile.
Subsidies for monks draw many highland children to
Kathmandu’s monasteries, a process that can be characterized as a rural “brain drain”. The sheer quantity of migration signiﬁcantly reduces the pool of young men who might
otherwise have aspired to village-based religious vocations
(e.g., bon-po or rtsis-pa). Furthermore, one must consider the
quality of those children who are sent. In an African setting
anthropologist Caroline Bledsoe has documented the criteria
parents use to assess the personal attributes of their offspring
and determine which of a family’s scarce resources should
be devoted to the upbringing of each child. The strategic intent is to maximize each child’s potential to contribute to
the household through the development of social networks,
economic assistance from paid employment, and so forth
(Bledsoe 1990). Similarly, parents in Nubri are aware that
talented and properly educated monks can reap signiﬁcant
monetary rewards. It is thereby safe to assume that parents
do not send sons at random to the monastery. Elsewhere I
have noted that children smitten with disabilities are often
designated to be village-resident monks (Childs 2004:70-71).
However, sending a disabled son to a monastery presided
over by a revered rinpoche is considered inappropriate. Do

parents send their most intellectually gifted children to the
monasteries? If so, their actions would amplify the intensity
of the brain drain.
Children from rural areas of Nepal who are raised and
educated in urban environments often develop a disdain for
their natal villages (dirty, undeveloped, no modern amenities) and the villagers they left behind (uneducated, uncouth,
and unclean), a process that is integrally tied with the discourse on development (see Des Chene 1996). In terms of
religious orientations, a cultural divide also arises between
those who are educated and think of themselves as modern,
and those rural-dwellers whom they characterize as being
“backwards” and “ignorant” (Bista 1991; see also
Pigg 1996). In terms of
religious orientations, a
cultural divide also arises
between young men who
are raised at prestigious
institutions in Kathmandu and those who remain
in the villages. Upon
returning home they encounter religious practices that do not accord with
what they have learned in
the monasteries. I have
spoken with monks who
disparage local religious
practices on the grounds
that they are corrupt and
degenerate [some most
certainly are, from a normative Buddhist perspective, e.g., animal sacriﬁce
(Childs 1997)]. Furthermore, monks who return
home are accorded places
of honor due to their vocation, education, and Reading sacred texts, Zanskar
status as disciples of great
masters. Therefore, one
can expect their opinions on religious matters to hold much
sway, especially as they become older and gain inﬂuence.
The question remains, do returning monks instigate changes
by trying to replicate the monastic systems in which they
spent their formative years?
Some monks from the highlands of Nepal have reached
maturity and now occupy senior administrative and liturgical positions within the exile monasteries of Kathmandu and
India. As potential gatekeepers, they are placed in an ideal
position to interact with their lama’s Western disciples. Sev-

eral have even accompanied their lamas on teaching tours to
Buddhist centers throughout the Western world. Education,
aptitude, and exposure to Western disciples can help a monk
forge personal contacts. Following the precedence set by
their own lamas, these contacts can translate into support for
new monastic initiatives back in their highland villages, akin
to a process described by Ramble concerning relationships
between tourists and indigenous Himalayan communities.
And now there is the Third Diffusion [of Buddhism], originating in the exile community. . . . The burgeoning international
interest in the Tibetan cause has less to do with a sporting
sympathy for the underdog than with a real appreciation of the
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universal relevance of Tibetan Buddhism. But the Third Spread
is not limited to the ﬁrst-world public undergoing a spiritual
crisis. It is also reaching the Tibetan-speaking people of the
Himalayan rimland. How?
The common enough scenario is that a businessman from,
say, Japan, United States or Taiwan becomes impassioned by
the Tibetan cause and goes trekking in the Himalaya. Because
he has Tibet on his mind, what he sees is a Tibetan culture
apparently fallen into decline: a struggling language, illiterate
monks, dilapidated temples, and a degenerate Lamaist tradition. With the blessing of his lama (who probably has never
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been to this place), he elects to help the area by building a
monastery. No objection, naturally, from the locals, who have
not to examine the gift horse too closely. To the outsider, at
least, the act looks like the commendable resuscitation of a
failing Buddhist heritage. (Ramble 1993:25)

Add to the trekking “businessman” another type of person, “Western Buddhist”—one who is already enamored by
Tibetan religion and especially the monastic traditions—and
you have parallel recipes for inducing culture change. On
the one hand monks who return to their villages are in a
good position to solicit donations from tourists to support
religious institutions. In places like Nubri, monks educated
in exile institutions are often the only locals who possess a
solid command of the English language. Their red robes are
the visible symbol of Buddhist culture that foreigners yearn
to encounter on their treks to the highlands, so they are
well situated to act as mediums for the support that Ramble
alludes to. On the other hand, I have encountered many
Western Buddhists who view the Himalayan hinterlands as
cultural backwaters, places where an infusion of monastic
institutions can reverse their relapsing tendencies and return
them to less adulterated forms of religious practice and social
organization. According to such a world view, the Himala-
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yan borderlands occupy an intermediary ground between
the pure land of Tibet where religion has been eradicated
and the resurrected monasteries in exile where the traditions
are being preserved. Transposing the monastic template
to indigenous Tibetan communities of Nepal is considered
both compassionate and progressive. Monks educated in exile monasteries, in particular those who have risen in the
monastic hierarchy and have foreign contacts, are the logical
conduits through which such a process can be facilitated.
A new monastery is now nearing completion in Nubri.
Funding is provided by a well-endowed institution in India,
which in turn is patronized by scores of devotees from the
West. The point-men for construction are three mkhan-bu
(disciples of the main monastery’s abbot), two of whom are
thirty year-old monks who were born in Nubri and sent to
South India while youths. When the monastery opens in the
summer of 2006 it is expected to be populated by ﬁfty or
so monks who are presently undergoing training in South
India. Their return will partially offset the out-migration
stimulated by monastic recruitment. In addition, their ascent of the local religious hierarchy will inevitably transform
ritual practices and social structures that have evolved in situ
over the centuries.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
I began with the provocative hypotheses that foreign
attempts to preserve Tibetan culture have stimulated
demographic and cultural transformation in the ethnically
Tibetan borderlands of Nepal. Contributions by Western
patrons to exile monasteries have provided critical support
for a monastic revival, which in turn has generated a rising
demand for new recruits. Meanwhile, the decline of fertility
among Tibetan exiles has shifted the primary recruiting
grounds from the refugee camps to the highlands of Nepal
where high fertility combined with household level economic
concerns offer compelling incentives to send children away
from the village. The parents are in a win-win situation: they
achieve religious merit, eliminate a son from the inheritance
equation, transfer the cost of raising and educating that child
to others, and can expect future remunerations. Foreign
patronage for exile monasteries is thereby directly responsible
for an unprecedented level of out-migration of youths from
their native highlands. These individuals subsequently
become instigators of culture change once they return as
fully-ordained monks. Some foreign patrons envision this as
a positive development, guided in their sentiments by the
belief that Buddhist societies of Nepal’s highlands—as in
Tibet—are properly constituted with celibate monasteries
occupying their focal points. In a personal conversation
about monks returning from Kathmandu to build the new
monastery in Nubri, one Western disciple declared, “They
[returning monks] will be bringing the Dharma back to their
homes.” Perhaps this person does not realize that Buddhism
is already well entrenched in Nubri, albeit not in a form that
revolves around celibate monasticism. Perhaps this person
interprets the dearth of monastic institutions and celibate
monks to mean that Nubri society has degenerated from
an archetypal Tibetan cultural template. If so, then actions
meant to resuscitate a “failing Buddhist heritage” have the
inadvertent effect of propelling indigenous Buddhist practices
and social structures to the periphery, and perhaps toward
extinction. Ergo, culture change is occurring as a direct
result of efforts geared toward cultural preservation.
This essay is not meant to be an indictment against Tibet’s
monastic tradition, which has proven to be remarkably
resilient and adaptive to new circumstances. Nor do I mean
to disparage Western patrons whose actions have undeniably
assisted in the preservation of Buddhist teachings, many
of which were threatened with extinction but are now
being transmitted to a new generation of guardians.
Beneﬁciaries, such as Tibetan exiles and parents in Nubri,
have few objections against the patronage received by their
religious institutions (c.f. Frechette 2004: 112-117) or the
new opportunities for managing their family compositions
and household economics arising from that patronage.
Furthermore, this essay should not be read as a lament about

cultural changes that are now occurring throughout the
Himalayan highlands. With respect to the nature of societies,
I subscribe to the Buddhist viewpoint on impermanence (i.e.,
change is natural and inevitable), which renders problematic
the very concept of “cultural preservation”. As one scholar
contends,
Tibetan culture, like any other, is dynamic; calling for its
‘preservation’ automatically brings forth the need for it to be
deﬁned, and this in turn leads to a stuffed-and-mounted item
ﬁt for a museum (Sperling 2000).

Here I need to conclude on a clear note: this is a theoretical essay about potential (and perhaps actual) consequences
stemming from the encounter between Tibetan lamas and
their Western patrons. Some of the evidence to support my
arguments is incontrovertible (e.g., fertility trends; solicitations for supporting monasteries are couched in terms of saving Tibetan culture). On the other hand, the diligent reader
will certainly notice, and perhaps be perturbed by, the fact
that some key arguments are not substantiated by reliable
data, or are supported by anecdotal evidence. Although some
parts of the thesis might sound convincing, and other parts
might seem intuitively obvious, there is much that can be—
and should be—subjected to critical scrutiny. A theoretical
essay is no substitute for diligent research, and therefore I
set forth the preceding arguments so that they can be evaluated, and then either accepted, reﬁned, or rejected in light
of empirical evidence. If this essay manages to nudge the
discourse on culture change toward hitherto under-explored
directions, then my goal to stimulate a more rigorous analysis of transnational processes in the Himalayan region will
be fulﬁlled.
ENDNOTES
1Revised edition (June 2005), for HIMALAYA. In 2001 I re-

ceived a letter from a teacher in Nubri, Nepal, who lamented that
his school was ﬂoundering because parents were sending the majority of their children to monasteries in Kathmandu and India.
This prompted me to write an e-mail rant to a friend, which was
forwarded (without my knowledge or permission, but in retrospect
it was a serendipitous act) and continued to make the rounds until
it crossed the desk of Barbara Brower. I am indebted to Barbara
for encouraging me to convert some unfocused thoughts into an
exploratory essay, which was completed in 2002. A delay in publication prompted me to include an abridged version of this essay’s
arguments in another publication (Childs 2004:68-70). The delay
also allowed me to thoroughly revise the paper after returning to
Nubri in May of 2005 for the ﬁrst time in nearly ﬁve years.
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